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THE NCAA AS REGULATOR, LITIGANT, 
AND STATE ACTOR 
Vikram David Amar* 
Abstract: As a general matter, the Constitution limits the government but 
not the private sector. Known as the “state action” doctrine, the idea that 
constitutional constraints apply only when public entities are primarily or 
substantially involved has been developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
scores of cases. This Article argues that the fundamental inadequacy of 
and dissatisfaction with the state action doctrine arises from the Court’s 
unwillingness to admit that state action principles are not transsubtan-
tive—that the principles play out differently depending on the particular 
constitutional claim being asserted. The Article surveys state action rul-
ings to argue that functional considerations—rather than a formalistic, 
abstract, and uniform quality of “stateness” —should and do dictate when 
the state action requirement is satsified and the Constitution’s limits are 
held to apply. The Article then analyzes the Supreme Court’s 1988 deci-
sion in NCAA v. Tarkanian to explore how a functionalist analysis might 
play out in the context of the NCAA and other athletic regulatory bodies. 
Introduction 
 Perhaps the most famous court case involving the National Colle-
giate Athletic Association (NCAA) during the organization’s first cen-
tury ended up being resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1988 in 
NCAA v. Tarkanian.1 The Supreme Court’s 5–4 ruling (which this Arti-
cle discusses further below) rejected the notion that the NCAA should 
be considered a “state actor” for purposes of a procedural due process 
claim brought by a men’s basketball coach who had been suspended by 
his public university employer based on an NCAA investigation, find-
ings of recruiting improprieties, and a recommendation for discipline.2 
 
* © 2011, Vikram David Amar, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Af-
fairs, UC Davis School of Law. This Article is a modified version of remarks presented at 
the Boston College Law Review’s symposium, “The NCAA at 100 Years: Perspectives on Its 
Past, Present, and Future,” held on October 15, 2010 in Newton, Massachusetts. I thank 
the organizers and participants at that symposium, who made many suggestions that 
helped me refine my ideas. 
1 488 U.S. 179, 181–82, 199 (1988). 
2 Id. at 180–99. 
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The Tarkanian ruling is significant insofar as it remains a key element of 
the modern state action principles that govern lawsuits against the 
NCAA and other athletic regulatory bodies.3 Much more fundamen-
tally, the Tarkanian ruling (and a subsequent case in 2001, Brentwood 
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, involving a high 
school analogue to the NCAA in which the Court drew upon and dis-
tinguished the Tarkanian case4) provides a useful window into the com-
mon features—and major shortcomings—of the modern Supreme 
Court’s doctrinal approach to the state action question more generally. 
 Part I of this Article provides an overview of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s prominent decisions involving the state action doctrine.5 Part II 
explores functional justifications for the state action doctrine, as op-
posed to the formalism of the doctrine itself. The Article proposes 
three major justifications.6 Part III then analyzes the two major U.S. 
Supreme Court cases involving the NCAA and athletic associations 
generally and highlights the unpredictability of the state action doc-
trine.7 Finally, Part IV examines how Tarkanian might have been de-
cided had the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a functionalist, as opposed 
to formalist, approach.8 
                                                                                                                     
I. An Overview of State Action Doctrine 
 It is probably fair to say that the range of modern state action case 
outcomes and the broader doctrinal framework that generates them 
satisfy very few people. It might be fair to call the area a mess. As a start-
ing point, everyone seems to agree that the Fourteenth Amendment— 
and indeed, its explicit text9—serves to limit what governments can do, 
but not what private individuals can do. This means that before we can 
 
3 Before Tarkanian, a number of rulings by lower courts (though by no means all of 
them) had found the NCAA to be a state actor in a variety of circumstances; afterwards, 
the trend has been decidedly against finding the NCAA to be a state actor. See, e.g., Dionne 
L. Koller, Frozen in Time: The State Action Doctrine’s Application to Amateur Sports, 82 St. John’s 
L. Rev. 183, 205–07 (2008). 
4 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 293–94, 297–
98 (2001). 
5 See infra notes 9–58 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes 59–83 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 84–107 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 108–133 and accompanying text. 
9 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
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apply a constitutional prohibition to an institution or individual’s con-
duct, we must be prepared to say, at some meaningful level, that the al-
leged violation is being perpetrated by the state. But how do we know 
such a thing, in a world where government is drawn into virtually all pri-
vate disputes because of society’s and government’s dispreference for 
(indeed often prohibition of) self-help remedies?10 Indeed, this ques-
tion is even more difficult in a world where public and private institu-
tions are yoked to each other in myriad complex ways involving licens-
ing, regulation, government subsidies, privatization of traditionally 
governmental activities, complex business partnerships between public 
and private entities, and so on. Do any or all of these private-public con-
nections transform otherwise private conduct into state action for con-
stitutional purposes? 
 One might be tempted to think that the task in these cases is to 
determine “stateness” as an abstract and uniform quality—to develop 
an objective description of the activities and conduct that constitutes 
state action regardless of the particular constitutional claim being as-
serted—and then to apply this transcendent description to each setting 
in which a constitutional violation is alleged. And indeed, this is what 
the Supreme Court usually purports to be trying to do in resolving state 
action questions. But this is a tough—indeed undoable—job, because 
there is literally nothing in the Constitution’s text, and very little in its 
history, that offers explicit criteria for distinguishing private and state 
action. Moreover, and relatedly, most observers (rightly) intuit that a 
defendant can and should be considered a state actor for purposes of 
one kind of constitutional claim even where the same defendant 
should not be deemed a state actor for a different kind of claim; this is 
true even if the essential characteristics of the defendant have not 
changed.11 It is thus virtually impossible to apply a uniform model of 
state action to all constitutional claims across the board—to all equal 
protection, Takings Clause, First Amendment, and procedural due pro-
cess claims—without regard to the substance of these provisions, be-
                                                                                                                      
10 Sometimes, regrettably, the U.S. Supreme Court seems oblivious to the govern-
ment’s prohibitions on self-help when it decides state action cases. For example, in De-
Shaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, in holding that a county was not 
subject to suit for its failure to protect a child from his violent father because the state did 
not commit any affirmative misdeed but at most was guilty of inaction, the Court ignored 
the fact that had the mother tried to take the child to save him, the government would 
have retrieved the child and placed him back with the father, and likely would have pun-
ished the attempted rescue. See 489 U.S. 189, 194–203 (1989). 
11 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1688–91 (2d ed. 1988). 
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cause such undifferentiated treatment would produce absurd and un-
tenable substantive results. 
 Consider, for example, one kind of prominent state action litiga-
tion—the so-called “public function” situation—in which the U.S. Su-
preme Court has held state action to exist even when the defendant was 
nominally a private actor on the ground that the defendant’s activities 
were inherently and quintessentially public in nature. In other words, 
the defendant’s activities were those we associate especially with gov-
ernment, and the simple fact that government has allowed them to be 
performed by private entities is not a sufficient reason to foreclose ap-
plication of the constitutional limitations that would otherwise bind 
had the activity been performed in the more traditional way, by gov-
ernment bodies.12 
 Illustrative of this category are the “white primary” cases, in which 
states had delegated election administration responsibility to private 
political parties and associations. When these private groups discrimi-
nated against black voters in the administration of primary elections, 
the Court came to apply the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to regulate the parties’ actions.13 Later, in its 1991 deci-
sion in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., the Court applied and ex-
tended these cases to prevent private lawyers who were exercising per-
emptory challenges from violating equal protection norms by removing 
jurors based on their race.14 As Justice Kennedy explained for the 
Court, in an important jury selection decision, just as government can-
not escape from constitutional constraints by farming out the task of 
picking voters, neither can it free itself from constitutional norms by 
giving private parties the power to pick jurors.15 
                                                                                                                     
 Another arguable example of a public function case is the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s famous 1948 decision, Shelly v. Kraemer.16 There, the 
Court applied the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate racially restric-
tive covenants in residential property deeds that prevented landowners 
from selling to African-Americans who wanted to purchase in the 
neighborhood.17 In one sense, these covenants were provisions in pri-
vate agreements that private homeowners agreed to respect when they 
 
12 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 8–23 (1948); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 
663–66 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88–89 (1932). 
13 See, e.g., Smith, 321 U.S. at 663–66; Condon, 286 U.S. at 88–89. 
14 500 U.S. 614, 625–26 (1991). 
15 Id. at 626. 
16 See generally 334 U.S. 1. 
17 Id. at 4, 8, 13, 18–21. 
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purchased their lots.18 But, in a deeper sense, when the racially restric-
tive language in the deeds was considered alongside the systemic terri-
torial segregation that was encouraged and supported not just by a few 
buyers and sellers, but also real estate developers, brokers, and lending 
institutions in the area, what really was going on was zoning—decisions 
about what entire neighborhoods (and not just particular parcels) 
would look and feel like. And zoning arguably falls within the “public 
function” domain. 
 Another example of the public function idea is found in Marsh v. 
Alabama, decided by the Supreme Court in 1946.19 There, a company 
required its workers to live in a “company town,” where streets, fire pro-
tection, police security, and such were provided not by traditional gov-
ernment agencies, but by units technically within and owned by a pri-
vate company.20 Under such circumstances, the Court held that the 
commercial parts of the town were really the functional equivalent of a 
municipal downtown, and so the First Amendment applied to protect 
residents’ freedom of expression.21 
 From one angle, these decisions make eminent sense; as Justice 
Kennedy pointed out, it would be odd and perverse for government to 
be able to shed constitutional limits simply by outsourcing government 
functions.22 But from another angle, the doctrine seems unworkable 
because there is no agreed-upon definition of what the function of gov-
ernment—especially state and local government—is. The essence of 
good government in our federalist system is that it evolves and adapts to 
grow, shrink, and flow into some areas and out of others, in response to 
changes in the economy, environment, and culture. For instance, when 
Plessy v. Ferguson23 was decided in 1896 by the U.S. Supreme Court, state 
and local government had a relatively small role to play in K–12 educa-
tion;24 by the time Brown v. Board of Education25 was decided by the Court 
in 1954, fewer than six decades later, primary and secondary education 
                                                                                                                      
18 Id. at 4, 13. 
19 See generally 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
20 Id. at 502–03. 
21 Id. at 508–10; see also Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley 
Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 316–25 (1968) (extending Marsh, in the area of labor speech, to a 
privately-owned large shopping center). 
22 See Edmondson, 500 U.S. at 624–28. 
23 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
24 The statute being challenged in Plessy involved, of course, railway cars rather than 
schools, but the Court invoked the analogy of school segregation to bolster its argument 
that forced separation of the races was not inherently stigmatic or problematic. Id. at 540–
41, 544–45. 
25 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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was the single biggest enterprise in which subnational government in 
America was engaged.26 And in the fifty years since Brown, the nature of 
local and state (and national, for that matter) government has changed 
quite a bit more. Many things that government used to provide— sanita-
tion, prisons, home security—are now left to private providers (though 
the providers are often heavily regulated and/or subsidized by govern-
ment). Even K–12 education has undergone major changes in many 
parts of the country with the advent of charter schools and school 
vouchers.27 
 The inevitable problems with the implementation of the public 
function concept28 have, over the past generation, caused the Court to 
be much less ambitious in invoking it. The 1978 U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in Flagg Bros. v. Brooks 29 is representative of this modern re-
trenchment. At issue in Flagg Bros. was the sale of plaintiff’s goods by a 
warehouseman who claimed the plaintiff had failed to pay her storage 
bill.30 State law permitted (by not prohibiting) warehousemen under 
such circumstances to undertake a forced sale of the personal property 
and to pocket whatever proceeds were required to satisfy the unpaid 
debt.31 The plaintiff in Flagg Bros. argued that such a forced sale was 
unconstitutional because she had not been afforded procedural due 
process in the determination that her account was in fact overdue be-
fore her property was taken from her.32 The Supreme Court rejected 
her claim on the ground that the warehouseman’s forced sale did not 
constitute state action; no state employee was involved, and no gov-
ernment entity specifically approved or authorized the sale.33 The deci-
sion to sell the goods, said the Court, was made by the private ware-
houseman, not the state.34 
                                                                                                                      
26 See id. at 492–93. 
27 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644–48, 656–59, 683–84 (2002) 
(discussing developments in the voucher movement). 
28 In some respects, the public function inquiry is, if not “unsound in principle,” just 
as “unworkable in practice” as the “traditional governmental function” test the Court 
abandoned in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority in trying to determine 
which federal regulations could, consistent with federalism, be applied against state and 
local governmental entities. 469 U.S. 528, 531, 537–48 (1985). 
29 436 U.S. 149 (1978). 
30 Id. at 151–53. 
31 Id. at 149, 151–53, 155–56. 
32 Id. at 151–53, 157–58. 
33 Id. at 157–66. 
34 Id. 
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 On this basis, the Court distinguished an earlier procedural due 
process case, Fuentes v. Shevin,35 a 1972 decision in which the Court had 
held that a claim and delivery (replevin) statute that allowed a creditor 
to get a writ from a judicial clerk to repossess a debtor’s property pur-
chased on an installment contract was unconstitutional because the 
creditor could obtain the repossession writ without the debtor having 
been given a procedural chance to challenge the creditor’s claim of 
delinquency at a hearing.36 Because the statute in Fuentes required each 
creditor to go to court and obtain a repossession writ, and the state law 
in Flagg Bros. did not require any involvement of judicial employees but 
rather reflected a disinclination for state involvement, Fuentes was not 
controlling.37 
 But what about the idea that seizing property to pay unpaid debts 
and to resolve disputes should be viewed as a government function that 
simply cannot be given away to private parties? The Court reasoned 
that for the public function exception to apply, the activity in question 
must be one that is reserved exclusively for the state, which was not true 
for commercial dispute resolution.38 Relatedly, the Court suggested 
that it is important to distinguish between state law regimes that com-
pel or require private parties to act against other persons (which could 
more easily give rise to state action) from regimes that simply permit 
self-help by failing to provide a regulatory regime (a situation that or-
dinarily does not create state action).39 From the Court’s perspective, 
all that New York had done through the adoption of its warehouseman 
lien statute was to deny judicial relief to debtors who protested a ware-
houseman’s sale of their stored goods.40 The state’s disinclination to 
provide a remedy for plaintiff’s asserted injury was not actionable state 
action any more than would be the state’s decision to enforce a statute 
of limitations that prevented a person from pursuing private damage 
redress because of the delay in bringing suit.41 
 Putting aside the obvious irony that a plaintiff is worse off when the 
state does nothing to help him (as in Flagg Bros.) than if the state does 
something small but incomplete to help him (as in Fuentes, where the 
                                                                                                                      
35 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
36 Id. at 80–96. 
37 Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 157. 
38 Id. at 157–63. 
39 See id. at 157–58, 161 n.11, 165; id. at 170 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing the 
majority decision); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 194–97 (invoking similar reasoning). 
40 See Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 161–63, 161 n.11, 162 n.12. 
41 See id. at 157–66. 
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state required creditors to obtain writs), there is a deeper problem with 
the reasoning in Flagg Bros.: like many other aspects of state action juris-
prudence, it simply isn’t—and can’t be—applied consistently across the 
cases. 
 Consider, for example, takings disputes. In Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission,42 a 1987 decision by the Supreme Court, the Coastal 
Commission (which regulates coastal land use in California) wanted 
property owners to allow the public to walk directly from one public 
beach to another across their beachfront land.43 A Commission regula-
tion overtly imposing a public easement on the land would, under pre-
vailing takings doctrine, likely have been considered a permanent physi-
cal invasion that required just compensation to the property owner.44 
But the Commission in Nollan instead conditioned its (required) ap-
proval of the homeowner’s plans to add existing structures on provision 
of the desired public access.45 The Commission believed that it had not 
violated the Takings Clause because the owner’s decision to confer the 
easement was a voluntary, bargained-for exchange that required no ad-
ditional compensation.46 
 When the homeowner protested, the Supreme Court ruled that 
the state’s conditions on permission to build were unfair and amounted 
to a taking, as compliance with those conditions would have required 
the homeowner to give up control over his beachfront property.47 But 
did this situation even constitute state action? Recall that state action is 
a requirement that must be satisfied before a constitutional violation 
can be found. The state action reasoning of Flagg Bros., if applied in 
Nollan, would have allowed 
a state to achieve the very result condemned in Nollan without 
paying one cent of compensation to property owners impacted 
by its action. All the state needs to do is to pass a law permit-
ting, but not compelling, members of the public to cross any 
private beachfront property that separates public lands without 
fear of legal sanction. As in Flagg Brothers, the state would be 
denying judicial relief to individuals suffering a private injury. 
In essence, the remedy for trespass would be eliminated in cer-
tain specified circumstances, but no agent of the state would 
                                                                                                                      
42 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
43 Id. at 828–29. 
44 Id. at 831. 
45 Id. at 828–29. 
46 See id. at 831–37; id. at 856 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
47 See id. at 838–42. 
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set foot on anyone’s private property. The state would simply 
be refusing to act to protect property against private infringe-
ment. Since the refusal to protect property against private in-
trusions under Flagg Brothers would not constitute state action, 
property owners could not assert a takings claim against the 
governmental entity that authorized the invasion of their 
land.48 
 The inconsistency that pervades state action doctrine can also be 
seen when we move from the public function cases to another category 
of rulings involving government subsidy to, regulation of, and entan-
glement with private actors. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,49 
a 1961 decision by the Supreme Court, a state-owned and state-
operated parking facility leased part of its grounds to a privately owned 
and privately run restaurant that refused to serve black customers.50 
Although the state had done nothing specifically to encourage the seg-
regation policy of its tenant, the Court, in an equal protection suit 
against the restaurant, found state action to be present because the 
land and buildings in which the activity took place were owned by the 
state, because the state and the restaurant were financially interde-
pendent, and because the state flag flying over the facility might have 
created an appearance of state control over all aspects of the property.51 
                                                                                                                     
 To be clear, this Article does not quarrel with the holding of Bur-
ton. But it is worth asking whether the Court—or most observers— 
would think there would be even a colorable claim of state action if the 
plaintiff had not been a customer complaining of race discrimination 
under the Equal Protection Clause, but instead had been a cook em-
ployed by the restaurant who felt he was being fired without a hearing 
required by principles of procedural due process. 
 In the same vein, consider the 1974 U.S. Supreme Court case, Jack-
son v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,52 where the plaintiff claimed she should 
have received a due process hearing before the electric company ter-
minated her service for alleged failure to pay her bill.53 The electric 
company was a heavily regulated entity—indeed, at that time, electric 
utilities were essentially state-facilitated monopolies providing essential 
 
48 Alan E. Brownstein, Constitutional Wish Granting and the Property Rights Genie, 13 
Const. Comm. 7, 12–13 (1996). 
49 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
50 Id. at 716. 
51 Id. at 721–26. 
52 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
53 Id. at 346–48. 
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services; customers had no real choice but to purchase those services, 
and they had no real choice among service providers.54 The utility 
needed the state, and the state needed the utility, such that the same 
(or a greater) level of symbiosis existing in Burton was arguably present 
here as well.55 Moreover, as to the appearance of state involvement, one 
would expect that people were more likely to assume utilities were fully 
public entities than restaurants, even restaurants that operated on 
property over which a state flag flies. 
 Nonetheless, because the state in Jackson had no direct involve-
ment in the decision by the utility to structure its service-termination 
procedures, there was no state action found.56 The kind of more gen-
eral connection between public and private entities that sufficed in Bur-
ton (and recall, in that case the state had nothing specifically to do with 
the restaurant’s policy of exclusion either) was simply not enough.57 
 It is hard to reconcile Burton and Jackson, unless we focus on the 
nature of the claim asserted (which the Court never seems inclined to 
do forthrightly). It is hard to imagine, as Justice Thurgood Marshall 
pointed out in his dissent in Jackson, that if the claim had not been one 
of procedural due process, but rather one of race discrimination—for 
example, allegations that the electric company explicitly refused to 
serve customers of color—the result would have been the same.58 
 It might be tempting simply to say that where race and free speech 
and certain property rights claims are involved, the U.S. Supreme 
Court is willing to stretch state action doctrine whereas, under proce-
dural due process, it is not. Even if descriptively accurate as a general 
matter, that characterization does precious little to answer the question 
it raises: why should certain claims in certain settings be treated differ-
ently than other claims in other settings for state action purposes, when 
the actors involved are the same and the Constitution under which the 
plaintiff sues is but a single unitary source of supreme law? 
II. Is a Functional Approach Superior? 
 A somewhat promising route in answering this question has come 
from those who identify the formalism of the doctrine as one of its 
main drawbacks.59 Instead of asking the abstract “what does a state in-
                                                                                                                      
54 See id. at 350–53. 
55 See id. at 357–58. 
56 Id. at 358. 
57 See id. at 357–58. 
58 Jackson, 419 U.S. at 373–74 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
59 See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 11, at 1688–1720. 
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herently look like?” question, perhaps we should ask why we desire to 
have a state action limitation at all. If we have a clear sense of the func-
tional, rather than formalistic, justifications for limiting the scope of 
the Fourteenth Amendment in the first place, perhaps we can assess 
the extent to which these justifications for the state action parameter 
are implicated in each case, and thus whether the Constitution’s norms 
ought or ought not to be extended and applied to a given defendant. 
 How might we identify such functional justifications? Sometimes, 
there are specific, pragmatic justifications that explain why particular 
existing roles or relationships counsel against finding individuals to be 
state actors in particular settings. For example, even though govern-
ment employees, when on the job and within the scope of their em-
ployment, are almost always considered state actors, a public defender 
who is representing an indigent criminal defendant is not considered a 
state actor because society values protection of the attorney-client rela-
tionship that itself finds expression in the Sixth Amendment.60 
 This Article focuses more globally on at least three (sets of) con-
siderations that courts and analysts might look to as underpinnings of 
the state action limitation. Section A of this Part focuses on federalism 
as a functional justification for the state action doctrine.61 Section B 
then discusses separation of powers as an underpinning of the state ac-
tion doctrine.62 Finally, Section C considers privacy and autonomy in 
regard to private behavior as a justification for the state action doc-
trine.63 
A. Functional Justification #1—Federalism 
 The Tenth Amendment reflects the idea that some questions are 
better left to local legislative decision making rather than uniform na-
tional resolution.64 Because the Constitution gives Congress the power 
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment through Section 5,65 reading 
the Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses to apply 
                                                                                                                      
60 The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. 
amend. VI. 
61 Infra notes 64–78 and accompanying text. 
62 Infra notes 79–82 and accompanying text. 
63 Infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
64 See U.S. Const. amend. X. 
65 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “Congress shall have the 
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV, § 5. 
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to all private conduct (i.e., abandoning a state action limitation) might 
be thought to add to Congress’s powers in a way that threatens local 
autonomy, experimentation, and compromise that considers and bal-
ances local conditions and complexities. 
 Case law from the U.S. Supreme Court in the last two decades ar-
guably moots the concern that eliminating the state action requirement 
will unwisely and expansively confer new powers on the federal legisla-
ture. Interestingly, this case law comes from two separate doctrinal 
strands, one that purports to limit federal power and one that embraces 
it. Falling within the former category are the Court’s 1997 decision in 
City of Boerne v. Flores 66 and its 2001 decision in Board of Trustees of the 
University of Alabama v. Garrett.67 Both cases promised limits on Con-
gress’s Section 5 power even when a Section 1 violation is found and 
state action is established.68 Under the so-called “congruence and pro-
portionality” test that emerged from these cases, Congress is substan-
tially constrained from going beyond the contours of the judicially rec-
ognized Fourteenth Amendment rights.69 If these two cases continue to 
represent the Court’s attitude about Section 5, then fear of congres-
sional domination through use of the Section 5 power is significantly 
reduced. 
 Falling within the latter category are two recent U.S. Supreme 
Court cases70 decided under the Commerce Clause71 and the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause.72 These cases may already authorize under Ar-
ticle I virtually any federal legislation regulating the private sphere that 
Congress wishes to pursue, rendering questions of Congressional power 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment more or less superflu-
                                                                                                                      
66 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
67 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
68 See generally Garrett, 531 U.S. 356; Flores, 521 U.S. 507. 
69 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365; Flores, 521 U.S. at 520. It should be noted that two more 
recent cases apply the “congruence and proportionality” test somewhat leniently—Nevada 
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs and Tennessee v. Lane create substantial uncertainty 
about the direction of the current doctrinal momentum. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 
516–34 (2004); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726–40 (2003). 
70 See generally United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 
U.S. 1 (2005). 
71 The Commerce Clause says that “[t]he Congress shall have the Power . . . [t]o regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
72 The Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary 
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers [previously mentioned], and 
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in 
any Department or Officer thereof.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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ous.73 In 2005, in Gonzales v. Raich,74 the Court upheld Congress’s 
power to prohibit local marijuana production, seemingly on either of 
two grounds: first, the prohibition was part of the federal Controlled 
Substances Act, a comprehensive integrated regulation of the entire 
narcotics industry; second, cultivation of marijuana, even for personal 
use, constituted commercial or economic activity subject to regulation 
under the Commerce Clause power because homegrown marijuana 
can serve as a substitute for market-purchased marijuana.75 In 2010, in 
United States v. Comstock,76 the Court upheld Congress’s power to civilly 
commit sexually dangerous federal prisoners whose prison terms have 
expired, on the ground that their federal prison stints might make 
states less likely to deal with these sexually dangerous persons.77 Blunt-
ing a problem that the federal government itself arguably helped create 
by incarcerating these prisoners pursuant to valid federal criminal laws 
is, opined six justices, within Congress’s Article I power to make laws 
necessary and proper for execution of its authorized powers (in this 
case, its power to make and implement criminal laws).78 
 Taken together, the expansive Commerce Clause and Necessary 
and Proper Clause powers seem to make the question of Congress’s 
ability to regulate under Section 5 much less important. As discussed 
below, however, some questions remain about how far the recent per-
missive cases should reach. 
B. Functional Justification #2—Separation of Powers 
 To the extent that the Constitution governs private conduct as well 
as government activity, rules regulating behavior and accommodating 
competing private interests will be developed, implemented, and then 
revised by the courts (especially the federal courts), rather than legisla-
tures and executive agencies. But does that give courts too large a role 
in lawmaking? The nub of this formidable separation of powers ration-
ale for a state action doctrine—which appears to be the weightiest ge-
neric justification for the Constitution’s values being limited to state 
actors—is that in a democracy, there should be a wide sphere of activity 
as to which the directly accountable governmental institutions should 
be the primary decisionmakers. To offer but a single example, it is one 
                                                                                                                      
73 See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1951–52, 1965; Raich, 545 U.S. at 10–33. 
74 545 U.S. 1. 
75 See id. at 10–33. 
76 130 S. Ct. 1949. 
77 Id. at 1951–52, 1965. 
78 Id. at 1965. 
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thing for Congress to pass a law like Title VII and for the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission to adopt regulations under that 
law. It would be a very different thing for a federal court to mandate 
Title VII’s substantive regulations on all public and private employers as 
a matter of fixed constitutional doctrine with which the elected 
branches could not even tinker. 
 The concern about authorizing judges to do too much is particu-
larly acute where rules regulating private conduct must balance many 
competing interests and thus will likely need to vary a great deal from 
actor to actor. Judges might not be as adept as legislatures at gathering 
the kind of comprehensive and reliable empirical information upon 
which to craft rules and carve out exceptions that make sense across the 
entire range of relevant human conduct. Again, Title VII may be a good 
example: the kind of detailed, nuanced, setting-specific rules needed to 
govern employers varying by size, industry, local demographics, and cul-
ture might have been easier for Congress—with its broad data-gathering 
powers and the access that various lobbying interests have to it—than 
for judges, who see but one case at a time when deciding whether to 
adopt or amend a regulatory rule. The situation presented by Shelly v. 
Kraemer,79 by contrast, perhaps made it easier to extend state action 
broadly than in the employment setting because in Shelly there were not 
as many competing interests to balance, and a simple no-discrimination-
in-any-residential-purchase-transaction rule might have been easier to 
implement and thus more attractive to adopt.80 
 Relatedly, separation of powers concerns might be heightened in 
areas where substantive constitutional doctrine is “softer” and thus 
harder to predict. For example, one reason why race discrimination 
equal protection norms have been more readily extended by the U.S. 
Supreme Court than procedural due process limits is that the latter 
have less predictable content. The Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test,81 
established by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1976, is much more manipu-
lable, and thus probably more erratic, than equal protection racial-
classification doctrine.82 
                                                                                                                      
 
79 334 U.S. 1 (1944). 
80 See generally id. 
81 424 U.S. 319, 332–35 (1976) (identifying three factors—what the individual has at 
stake in a dispute, how much additional procedures will enhance the accuracy of the ultimate 
result of the dispute, and the cost of such additional procedures—that must be weighed in a 
cost-benefit balance to determine what process is constitutionally due). 
82 For example, many were surprised by the invocation and specific application of the 
Matthews test in the War on Terror setting in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507 (2004). This is not to say that equal protection doctrine, by comparison, is always 
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C. Functional Justification #3—A Cluster of Privacy, Autonomy,  
and Liberty Concerns 
 Finally, the need for state action limits might in part be attribut-
able to the fact that many constitutional rules would be unreasonably 
intrusive if we applied them to all private behavior. For example, firing 
and disciplining government employees properly triggers procedural 
due process requirements. But very few people think that parental pun-
ishment of children should implicate formal procedural protection. 
 This cluster of privacy and autonomy considerations seems power-
ful, but the case law, because it clings to the formalistic approach to 
state action discussed above, offers very little guidance as to what insti-
tutions, relationships, or individuals should benefit from this zone of 
freedom from governmental norm imposition. 
 There appear to be a number of factors that might militate in favor 
of a state action limit. For example, intimate settings and associations 
(small employers, families, romantic relationships, friendships), expres-
sive associations and organizations, and commercial arrangements be-
tween parties who have decided between themselves—and in ways that 
do not spill over to others—which rules should govern interactions be-
tween them are all good candidates as beneficiaries of some state action 
limitations.83 
III. What We Can Learn from Tarkanian and Other Cases 
Involving Athletic Associations 
 The NCAA, an unincorporated association that in 1989 comprised 
960 public and private member colleges and universities, conducts in-
vestigations and makes factual determinations in order to impose pen-
alties upon member institutions that have violated the organization’s 
                                                                                                                      
easy to apply. Even tests like “strict scrutiny” mean different things in different contexts, 
and do try to take account, in their implementation, of relevant differences between dif-
ferent kinds of harms and different kinds of state interests. Moreover, there may be addi-
tional reasons why equal protection is an easier setting in which to extend state action; 
there may be broader national consensus on certain equal protection antidiscrimination 
norms than on what constitutes fair procedural treatment. 
83 This “private ordering” rationale is the best defense of an otherwise questionable re-
sult in Flagg Bros. v. Brooks. 436 U.S. 149, 155–66 (1978). There was an agreement between 
the warehouseman and the person whose goods were being stored about how disputes 
over missed payments would be resolved and how debts would be satisfied. See id. at 153. 
Unless we are prepared to void that agreement as unconscionable, then respect for the 
private decisions of the contracting parties weighs heavily against ex post government in-
tervention through extension of the state action doctrine. 
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rules concerning fair athletic competition.84 The NCAA is not author-
ized to impose sanctions directly upon the student-athletes or employ-
ees who attend or work at the member academic institutions and whose 
conduct typically gives rise to NCAA rules violations.85 After a lengthy 
investigation in the 1970s into the men’s basketball program at the 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV), the NCAA found thirty-eight 
violations, including at least ten committed by the men’s basketball 
coach, Jerry Tarkanian.86 The NCAA imposed sanctions on UNLV and 
threatened to impose additional punishments on the university if the 
school did not suspend Coach Tarkanian for a period of time.87 The 
school ultimately gave in to the pressure from the NCAA to suspend 
Tarkanian; Tarkanian then brought suit against the university and the 
NCAA, alleging a deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment proce-
dural due process rights.88 In 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court in NCAA v. 
Tarkanian ultimately rejected his claim against the NCAA by a 5–4 vote, 
concluding that the NCAA was not a state actor for these purposes.89 
 Prior to the Tarkanian ruling the courts were split on the charac-
terization of the NCAA. Initially, in the 1970s, federal courts of appeals 
held that the NCAA was a state actor, and then during the 1980s, the 
trend was the opposite.90 Since the Tarkanian ruling, the legal princi-
ples concerning the applicability of the Constitution to the NCAA have 
been “frozen in time.”91 
 The Court’s finding of no state action in the Tarkanian case is at the 
very least open to question. Most of the NCAA’s members—that is, most 
of the Associations’ policy formulators—were (and remain today) public 
institutions.92 And there is no real question about whether the NCAA 
                                                                                                                      
84 NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183 (1988). 
85 Id. at 184. 
86 Id. at 185–86. 
87 Id. at 186. 
88 Id. at 187–88. 
89 Id. at 180, 191–99. 
90 See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 182 n.5. 
91 See Koller, supra note 3, at 183. 
92 See Differences Among the Three Divisions: Division I, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ 
wcm/connect/public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/who+we+are/differences+among+the+div 
isions/division+i (last updated Dec. 20, 2010) (stating 66% of Division I schools are public 
and 34% are private); Differences Among the Three Divisions: Division II, NCAA, http://www. 
ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/About+the+NCAA/Who+We+Are/Differences 
+Among+the+Divisions/Division+II (last updated Dec. 20, 2010) (stating 53% of Division 
II schools are public and 47% are private). 
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was the “but for” and proximate cause of Tarkanian’s public employer’s 
decision to suspend him.93 
 Nonetheless, a five-member majority saw no state action by the 
NCAA that implicated constitutional due process.94 The vote lineup in 
the case was unique: Justices Stevens, along with Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices Blackmun, Scalia, and Kennedy made up the majority. Jus-
tice White wrote a dissent in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and 
O’Connor joined.95 These nine justices heard about 350 cases from the 
time Justice Kennedy joined the Court (in February 1988) until the time 
Justice Brennan left the Court and was replaced by Justice Souter (in the 
fall of 1990). In no other case during the time these nine justices served 
together was the Tarkanian lineup repeated, even though there were 
about seventy or more 5–4 rulings during this period.96 
 The lineup was not the only strange aspect of the case. The major-
ity’s reasoning was quite unusual, whether or not the result was correct 
(a question on which this Article takes no firm position). Justice Ste-
vens’ majority opinion offered a few main reasons to explain why the 
Constitution does not apply to the NCAA. One justification, and the 
most conclusory one, was that although promoting and administering 
college athletics is “critical,” it is “by no means . . . a traditional, let 
alone an exclusive, state function.”97 Another justification was that be-
cause Nevada was but one state among many whose public universities 
were members of the NCAA (with the vast majority of NCAA member 
institutions being located outside of Nevada), holding the NCAA to be 
an agent of Nevada law was untenable.98 The third justification was that 
UNLV—the public university that actually imposed the sanctions on 
Coach Tarkanian—was not in agreement with the NCAA. Instead, it 
resisted the NCAA’s demands and could have withdrawn from the 
NCAA if it chose, such that the NCAA was not really forcing any harm 
upon Coach Tarkanian at the hands of government agents.99 
                                                                                                                      
93 See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 185–88. 
94 See id. at 191–99. 
95 See id. at 180. 
96 The only way to prove a negative assertion like this is to examine the statistics at the 
end of each of the October 1987, 1988, and 1989 Terms. These statistics can be found in a 
number of places, but I consulted the first issues of the Harvard Law Review (which com-
piles year-end statistics in the issue featuring its foreword, for each of these years). See The 
Statistics, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 359, 361, 362 (1990); The Statistics, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 394, 396–
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97 Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 197 n.18. 
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 None of these justifications withstands reason. As to the first, as 
explained above, it is hard to say anything is an exclusive public func-
tion, especially if states are permitted to experiment the way the labora-
tory vision of federalism would seem to permit. As for the second, sure-
ly states cannot join each other in a multi-state organization and escape 
the Constitution’s limits because the organization speaks for all states 
but no one in particular. For example, agencies created by interstate 
compacts under Article I, Section 10100 ought to be “state actors” when 
they regulate. And, as to the third, to speak of UNLV’s “option” to leave 
the NCAA (and thus to leave big-time sports) was silly in 1989; it is even 
more laughable today. 
 More generally, the Tarkanian case illustrates major pitfalls of mod-
ern doctrine in that it lacks any discussion of first principles. The major-
ity and dissenting opinions discussed only cases, not constitutional val-
ues or objectives. In that sense, the case was not unusual at all; it fit in all 
too well with the formalist approach the Court has taken. And, even if 
the precedent game were the right one to play, the Tarkanian decision 
could easily have fit the test from the Court’s 1961 decision in Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Authority.101 There is a clear symbiosis between public 
universities and the NCAA (neither can support a sports program— 
something both want to do for a variety of commercial, fundraising, and 
esprit de corps reasons—without the help and participation of the other). 
Moreover, many outside observers—indeed, all but the most avid read-
ers of the U.S Reports102—would probably think the NCAA in its regula-
tory capacity partakes of governmental authority and status. 
 The other major U.S. Supreme Court ruling involving state action 
and athletic associations—the 2001 Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secon-
dary School Athletic Ass’n103 decision, which held a high school athletic 
association whose membership consists of public and private high 
schools within a single state to be a state actor104—is no better in these 
regards, notwithstanding the fact that it reaches a result that is probably 
correct. Again, there was no discussion of why we have a state action lim-
itation in deciding what its contours should be. Even the dissent paid 
                                                                                                                      
100 This provision implies that with the consent of Congress, a state is permitted to “en-
ter into . . . Agreement[s] or Compact[s] with another State, or with a foreign power . . . .” 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
101 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721–26 (1961). 
102 Cf. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 689 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) (sarcastically referring to “casual readers of this Court’s Commerce Clause deci-
sions”). 
103 531 U.S. 288 (2001). 
104 Id. at 290–91, 295–305. 
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only lip service to functional values. It initially mentioned liberty and 
federalism as justifications for limiting the Constitution,105 but then nev-
er returned to them to resolve the case. Again, the only game the jus-
tices seemed to be playing is the analogy/distinction game with respect 
to past cases. And the big distinction of Tarkanian that purports to ex-
plain the opposite result in Brentwood—that all the member high schools 
who comprised the association were located within a single state— 
should not carry the weight it was assigned.106 As discussed above, the 
interstate character of an organization should not bear much on 
whether it is a governmental actor for constitutional purposes.107 
IV. How Should the NCAA Have Fared in the Tarkanaian Case 
Under a More Sophisticated Functional Approach? 
 What should the result in Tarkanian have been if a more functional 
and more nuanced approach had been used? Although the purpose of 
this Article is not to provide a definitive answer to this question, the Ar-
ticle does assert that to answer it intelligently, we need to return to and 
apply the functional values themselves. 
A. Federalism 
 Given that the NCAA is a national association (and seems commit-
ted to remaining one) and its members want national standards of 
conduct, there appears to be little or no value in having states or locali-
ties work out how the NCAA should treat individual employees or ath-
letes. The federalism justification for limiting the Constitution’s reach 
presupposes some utility in diverse local regulation, a utility that here is 
seemingly lacking. 
 Indeed, there is some question as to whether state and local gov-
ernments even have the power to regulate the NCAA’s dispute resolution 
activities. After the Tarkanian case, the legislature of Nevada attempted 
to regulate the NCAA’s operation in the state, and in 1993 the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in NCAA v. Miller, struck down 
the effort as an undue and impermissible burden on interstate com-
merce under the balancing test articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in its 1970 decision in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.108 
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107 See supra notes 70–78 and accompanying text. 
108 See NCAA v. Miller, 10 F. 3d 633, 637–40 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Pike v. Bruce 
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B. Separation of Powers 
 As noted earlier, some compromises in regulating conduct are bet-
ter left to legislatures than courts. Is that value implicated in the NCAA 
procedural due process setting? First, we must decide whether any legis-
lature is even empowered to act here. If none is, the choice about regu-
lation is not between courts and legislatures (which is a true separation 
of powers decision), but rather between courts and no one at all.109 As 
just observed, there is a question whether state legislatures can pre-
scribe NCAA procedures. What about Congress? 
 Congress ordinarily can regulate dispute resolution. It does so in 
federal labor law,110 and it does so in the Federal Arbitration Act.111 But 
these laws arguably constitute parts of larger, integrated regulations of 
the larger economic systems, and thus might be easier to sell under 
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers and the Court’s 2005 decision in 
Gonzales v. Raich.112 What if Congress did not regulate much or all of 
college sports economics but adopted a “single-subject” law prescribing 
NCAA procedures for dealing with coaches and/or athletes? Would 
that be permissible? 
 There may not be a clear answer to that question, in part because it 
is unclear whether dispute resolution and sanction imposition by a vol-
untary unincorporated (and not-for-profit) association would be con-
sidered “economic activity” by the Court under the Commerce Clause. 
It seemed as though that question would be answered eight years ago in 
the 2003 U.S. Supreme Court case Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen, 
but that case ended up being resolved on different grounds.113 
 At issue in Guillen was a congressional scheme that required each 
state seeking federal funding for roadways to study, compile and collect 
information concerning “hazardous locations, sections and elements” of 
“all public roads” within the state.114 Congress desired this information 
                                                                                                                      
109 Of course, libertarians might still find virtue in a state action limitation here, for 
reasons addressed below involving the cluster of autonomy and privacy concerns that 
might underlie doctrinal instincts. 
110 See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006). 
111 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
112 See generally 545 U.S. 1 (2005). Should it even really matter that federal labor law 
regulates so broadly? Shouldn’t Congress be able to regulate labor disputes without also 
regulating wages and hours? Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Raich doubtless had some force 
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how to draft and combine statutory regulations. 
113 537 U.S. 129, 140–48 (2003). 
114 Id. at 133. 
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so that it could decide which roadway safety improvements to fund.115 
States complained that assembling and retaining this information might 
hurt them in civil litigation brought by persons injured at any of the ar-
eas studied and documented.116 Congress responded to this concern by 
enacting another provision saying that the information “compiled or 
collected” to satisfy federal requirements “shall not be subject to discov-
ery or admitted into evidence in a Federal or State court proceed-
ing . . . .”117 A plaintiff who later sued Washington County for dangerous 
roadway conditions after his wife was killed in an automobile accident 
challenged the congressional prohibition on disclosure of the state’s 
studies as beyond Congress’s Article I enumerated powers.118 
 The Court upheld Congress’s power to insulate this information 
from discovery or introduction into evidence under the Commerce 
Clause.119 Justice Thomas explained that the case fell into a specific 
strand of doctrine dealing with transportation networks: 
Congress could reasonably believe that adopting a measure 
eliminating an unforeseen side effect of the information-
gathering requirement of [the statute] would result in more 
diligent efforts to collect the relevant information, more can-
did discussions of hazardous locations, better informed deci-
sionmaking, and, ultimately, greater safety on our Nation’s 
roads. Consequently, . . . [the law] can be viewed as legislation 
aimed at improving safety in the channels of commerce and 
increasing protection for [roadways.]120 
 Putting aside the roadway aspect, Guillen is particularly interesting 
when contrasted with the two other major Commerce Clause cases de-
cided by the U.S. Supreme Court since the mid-1990s—Lopez v. United 
States121 and Morrison v. United States.122 In 1995, in Lopez, the Court held 
that the federal Gun Free Schools Zone Act, which made it a crime to 
possess a gun near a school, did not fall within Congress’s Commerce 
Clause powers.123 And, in 2000, the Court in Morrison held the same for 
                                                                                                                      
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 133–34. 
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the Federal Violence Against Women Act.124 In both cases, the Court 
found that Congress was not entitled to much leeway because the activi-
ties Congress was attempting to regulate were not themselves economic: 
possessing guns near schools and committing violence for misogynistic 
reasons simply are not economic actions.125 
 The Court in Guillen makes no reference to this question. Justice 
Thomas does not ask whether the discovery of information or its intro-
duction into evidence—the very activity regulated by the federal stat-
ute—is economic or not.126 Whether litigation is an economic activity 
within the meaning of Lopez and Morrison seems to me an interesting, 
and perhaps complex, question. 
 Even if Congress could regulate the NCAA, would it be better than 
courts in fashioning procedures? Procedural due process doctrine can 
be volatile and unpredictable. For example, the standards concerning 
War on Terror detainees that emerged in the 2004 U.S. Supreme Court 
decision Hamdi v. Rumsfeld127 came seemingly out of nowhere. The 
Court has had quite a journey in the procedural due process arena, 
with no sure footing.128 Racial segregation settings, by contrast, seem at 
least somewhat more doctrinally predictable and straightforward. 
 Additionally, procedural due process rights often amount to a bar-
gaining chip that competing organizations or institutions use as they 
work out deals. In the labor setting, for example, a union may give up 
procedural due process protections for its members in order to get bet-
ter substantive benefits. Shouldn’t we respect that private tradeoff or-
dering, as in Flagg Bros. v. Brooks?129 Perhaps this concern is irrelevant in 
the particular context of the Tarkanian case, as the coaches (and ath-
letes) whose fates are affected are not themselves members of or bar-
gainers with the NCAA, and there are serious questions about whether 
the member universities can be trusted to fully represent their interests. 
 Finally, in defense of the majority’s result in Tarkanian, procedural 
due process may be a setting in which periodic tinkering in light of 
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empirical experience is particularly helpful, and legislatures can tinker 
with procedural rules more readily than can courts. Ever since the U.S. 
Supreme Court made clear in 1985 in Cleveland Board of Education v. 
Loudermill130 that procedural due process requirements are a constitu-
tional minimum that state legislatures cannot supplant even when they 
think other procedures make more sense, legislatures have been less 
able to engage in a dialogue with courts over the proper mix of proce-
dures.131 On the flip side, of course, one can argue that courts are par-
ticularly good at crafting procedure. Indeed, procedure and dispute 
resolution is what constantly occupies judges’ time. Thus, courts may 
have experience and expertise in this area that legislatures lack. 
C. The Autonomy, Privacy, Private Ordering Cluster 
 A look at NCAA’s Constitution suggests that it is neither an intimate 
association nor an expressive association that should partake of auton-
omy under the principles discussed earlier. Instead, it appears to be es-
sentially a regulatory association.132 Moreover, as already mentioned, 
because the coaches and student athletes are themselves not members 
of the association who have agreed to be regulated in exchange for cer-
tain consideration, and because the universities who are the members 
and who presumably do exercise some clout cannot be seen as full rep-
resentatives of the coaches and athletes within the schools, there does 
not seem to be a private ordering in the Tarkanian case that is worthy of 
respect.133 If a private university member of the NCAA itself were to 
bring a procedural due process claim to resist sanctions, that might very 
well present a different situation. 
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this Article is not to suggest, of course, that the 
NCAA should be a state actor for all purposes. For example, the Article 
does not argue that the NCAA should be a state actor in the case of pri-
vate ordering relating to NCAA employees, and maybe even member 
schools. The Article does not even argue that the NCAA should be a 
state actor for all procedural due process purposes when sued by disci-
plined student athletes or coaches. The Article argues only that we 
                                                                                                                      
130 470 U.S. 532, 538–48 (1985). 
131 Id. 
132 NCAA Const. art. 1.2, in Division I Manual (2010) (statement of purpose), avail-
able at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D111.pdf. 
133 See supra note 83. 
438 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:415 
need to go beyond facile invocations of a few of the many hard-to-
reconcile cases and ask why or why not the extension of formal proce-
dures to protect employees and athletes in particular settings makes 
constitutional sense. 
